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 Abstract 
 
 
 
 Various possible explanations for the turnout increase of nearly 6 percentage points in the 
1992 U.S. presidential election as compared to the 1988 election are examined, using both survey 
and state-level data.  The turnout impact of Perot's candidacy, surprisingly, is found to be 
negligible.  Neither is support found for views frequently expressed in the media that the economic 
recession and MTV's 'Rock the Vote' registration campaign aimed at young people played 
substantial roles in stimulating additional voter participation.  Only a small fraction of the turnout 
rise can be attributed to the spread and maturation of 'motor voter' registration programs at the state 
level between the 1988 and 1992 elections.  The mystery is 'resolved' in part by evidence that, from 
the perspective of recent history, the low turnout of 1988 is at least as great an anomaly as the high 
turnout of 1992.  Unfortunately, there are few clues as to what factors peculiar to the 1988 
elections led turnout to be so low in that year.    
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 The post-1960 decline in voter turnout in U.S. presidential elections has been analyzed 
extensively by Teixeira (1992) and others.  The election of 1984 was the first since 1960 to show 
an increase from the preceding presidential year, but this small rise was followed in 1988 by a 
record low.  The 1992 election, however, saw a return to 1970s-level participation, with 55.9% of 
the voting age population casting ballots, compared to only 50.1% in 1988.  Whether this increase 
was temporary, or indicative of a counter-trend, depends in large part on whether higher turnout 
was a product of election-specific factors such as Ross Perot's candidacy, or of more permanent 
changes such as the trend toward easier voter registration.   
 Related to these issues is that of whether higher turnout added to Clinton's margin of 
victory.  If the 1992 turnout signalled a trend, and if Democrats really do benefit from higher 
participation at the expense of Republicans, the prospects of Democratic candidates in future races 
may be improved.  Evidence is mixed, however, on whether higher-turnout elections have in the 
past have actually favored Democrats on balance (Erikson, 1995; Radcliff, 1995, 1994; DeNardo, 
1980; Tucker and Vedlitz, 1986).    
 This paper explores the possible role in accounting for the turnout rise of several factors 
commonly cited both before and after the 1992 election as positive influences on participation rates. 
 Attention is focused primarily on the Perot candidacy, the recession, MTV's 'Rock the Vote' 
campaign targeted at young people, and new 'motor voter' provisions adopted by many states 
making it easier to register.  Curtis Gans, director of the Committee for the Study of the American 
Electorate, claimed that 'the entire increase in participation can be traced to Ross Perot's candidacy' 
(Newsday, November 10, 1992).  Patrick Lippert, then executive director of 'Rock the Vote,' 
boasted after the election that 'two million more young people voted' (Washington Post, January 19, 
1993, C3) as a result of the MTV-sponsored campaign to raise turnout among the young, who 
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historically in the U.S. have voted at very low rates.  This paper explores whether the turnout rise 
can be statistically explained by these factors.  
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
 
 Several of these factors can be analyzed using state-level data on turnout.  Using a pooled 
time-series, cross-section model of turnout in presidential elections over the 1976-92 period permits 
tests of the impact of Perot's candidacy, motor voter, the recession, and other variables alleged to 
have helped produce the rise in voter participation.  This model controls for 'resource' variables 
such as education and income included in many turnout studies (e.g., Rosenstone and Hansen, 
1993), and 'mobilization' variables such as the presence of Senate and gubernatorial races on the 
ballot (Caldeira, Patterson, and Markko, 1985; Boyd, 1986).   
 Time-series, cross-section data also permit the use of fixed state and year effects.  In 
models with fixed state effects, coefficients are estimated exploiting only within-state variation over 
time.  Fixed state effects control for important otherwise unmeasurable turnout determinants 
varying substantially across states but very little over time, which may be correlated with the 
variables of interest.  These models are far more useful for testing hypotheses regarding variables 
exhibiting large variation over time -- such as the Perot vote share, unemployment, and motor voter 
programs that are the focus of this analysis -- as opposed to variables such as registration closing 
date and demographic characteristics, which change relatively little over the 1976-92 period.  (See 
Stimson, 1985, for further explanation of fixed-effects models.)   
 Table 1 reports results from these tests of state-level turnout.  Weighted least squares (with 
voting-age population as the weight variable) is used to correct for heteroskedasticity, as the error 
variance in state-level turnout models is found to be significantly and inversely correlated with 
voting-age population in tests using OLS.   
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 [TABLE 1 HERE] 
 The major 'resource' variable, percent of the over-25 population with a high-school diploma, 
is positively and significantly associated with turnout in Table 1.  Each 3-percentage point rise in 
the diploma rate is associated with a turnout rise of 1 percentage point.  Increases in per capita 
income also increase state turnout.  Increases in the number of recent movers, as measured by the 
percentage of residents living at their current address less than 5 years, are associated with reduced 
turnout, as expected, but this effect is also not significant.  Similarly, increases in the percentage of 
adults who are less than 25 years old lower turnout, but not significantly so.
i
   
 Turnout is nearly 2 percentage points higher on average (significant at .05) when there is a 
gubernatorial race on the ballot.  The presence of a Senate race on the ballot has a much smaller 
and insignificant effect.  These results are both consistent with those of Boyd (1986), who uses 
survey data.    
 Among registration-law variables, the adoption of mail-in registration is associated with a 
nearly 2-percentage-point rise in turnout.  Registration closing date has the anticipated negative 
sign but is not significant.   
 Limited variation over time within states in the demographic variables, and in registration 
closing date, may be responsible for their lack of statistical significance.  Variation over time is 
very high, however, in the variables tested in Table 1 which are alleged to have played a role in the 
turnout rise, making the fixed-effects model an appropriate one for testing their turnout impacts.  
These factors include the Perot candidacy, the recession, motor voter, term limit initiatives, and 
election closeness, which are considered in turn below.  Evidence from Voter Research and 
Surveys (VRS), the National Elections Studies (NES), the Census Bureau's Current Population 
Survey, and other data sources will be used to supplement the state-level results in Table 1, in 
considering the effects of 'Rock the Vote' and other factors.   
 Before turning to this evidence, it is instructive to examine the year effects estimated from 
  
 
 4 
the state-level model. (The coefficients for the state and year dummy variables are not reported in 
the table for reasons of space.)  Controlling for the variables included in Table 1 -- which includes 
most of the factors idiosyncratic to the 1992 election and alleged to account for the turnout increase 
-- there remains an unexplained gap of more than 4 percentage points between turnout in 1988 and 
1992:       
 Year   Estimate  Std. error 
 1976     5.89      2.45 
 1980     3.42      2.12 
 1984     1.78      1.65 
 1988   -4.16      1.27 
 1992     0.00 (reference year) 
 
Thus, accounting for Perot, term limits, motor voter, the recession, and state-level closeness, about 
4.2 percentage points of the 6-point rise from 1988 to 1992 remains unexplained.  The pattern 
among four of these year-dummy coefficients is consistent with the gradual downward trend 
observed since the 1960s.  The 1988 value is an outlier, however, suggesting that a portion of the 
6-point rise in 1992 relative to 1988 may be due to factors idiosyncratic to the 1988 election.  This 
finding is consistent with the results presented below, in which the various factors peculiar to the 
1992 election are dismissed one by one as important sources of the turnout rise.  Where the data 
permit, attempts are made below (although with very limited success) to identify possible culprits in 
the low turnout of 1988.  The mystery of low 1988 turnout will remain mostly unexplained.  
 
3. THE PEROT CANDIDACY 
 
 From the perspective of spatial voting models in which greater distances between candidate 
positions and voters' ideal points are associated with increased abstention, Perot's or any other 
third-party candidacy can be expected to increase turnout.  History suggests that the turnout impact 
of a third-party candidacy is very modest.  Turnout was lower in 1968 than in 1964, despite a much 
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closer election and the fact that George Wallace's candidacy was popular enough to actually win 
several states (unlike Perot's).  Similarly, the downward trend in turnout continued in 1980, despite 
John Anderson's highly visible presence in the campaign.  Rosenstone et al. (1993) report 
regression results showing that major third-party candidacies in the 20th century have not on 
balance been associated with higher turnout rates.   
 Perot's candidacy, however, was popularly believed to have attracted a different kind of 
voter -- namely disillusioned and cynical persons who would have otherwise sat out the election -- 
from other recent third-party candidates.  Among respondents in the 1992 NES indicating a 
preference for Perot in post-election interviews, 54% agreed that 'quite a few' government officials 
are crooked, compared to only 39% of the remaining respondents.  Trust in government showed 
similar differences, with 79% of Perot supporters, and only 60% of others, replying that 
government officials could be trusted only 'some of the time' or 'never' (the other choices were 
'always' or 'most of the time').   
 Survey evidence provides little support, however, for the belief that there is a large pool of 
eligible voters who abstain out of a disgust with politics.  In most past elections, NES respondents 
who believe that government officials are crooked, or that they can't be trusted, are no less likely to 
vote than other respondents (Miller and Traugott, 1989, p. 308), even when other determinants of 
turnout are accounted for.  If the conventional wisdom is wrong and there is in fact very little 
disgust-based abstention, Perot's candidacy should not have been expected to attract sizeable 
numbers of new voters.     
 There are some modest indications of a mobilization of the disaffected in 1992 relative to 
1988, however.  Among 'low-trust' NES respondents to the 1988 NES, 66.6% reported having 
voted as opposed to 73.9% of the remainder.  This gap narrows in the 1992 NES: the 74.9% 
self-reported turnout of low-trust respondents nearly matches the 76.6% reported by other 
respondents.  The 8.3 percentage point turnout increase among low-trust respondents from one 
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election to the next is three times larger than the 2.7 point rise among high-trust respondents.  
Assuming that the difference in the increase between the two groups is entirely attributable to Perot 
(i.e., that turnout of both low-trust and high-trust respondents would have risen by the same 2.7 
percentage points if Perot had not run), a roughly 3.5-point rise in turnout -- or over one-half of the 
total increase -- could be credited to Perot's candidacy (5.6% of the 63.1% of respondents indicating 
they trusted government officials only 'sometimes' or 'never' in 1992 -- an increase from only 50.4% 
in the 1988 NES).     
 More direct evidence of Perot's impact on turnout is available.  In exit polls conducted by 
VRS, 14% of Perot voters when asked their second choice indicated they would have abstained 
from the presidential contest had Perot not been on the ballot.  This estimate implies a turnout 
increase of about 1.5 percentage points (Perot voters were 18.9% of all voters, and voters were 56% 
of the voting-age population: .14 x .189 x .56 = .0149).    
 Voter self-reports cannot be accepted uncritically, however.  Perot supporters may have 
been merely demonstrating their loyalty by claiming to find other candidates unacceptable, biasing 
the Perot effect upward.  Also, estimates from this survey question neglect 'external effects': it is 
not only the Perot voters themselves who might have been attracted to the polls by his candidacy, 
but also Clinton and Bush supporters whose interest in this highly-competitive race was heightened 
by Perot's candidacy.    
 State-level variations in turnout and the Perot vote share can provide more objective 
evidence regarding Perot's impact on turnout.  To the extent that interest and competitiveness 
effects of Perot's candidacy vary by state, these effects can be captured in a state-level turnout 
regression.  While turnout was much higher in 1992 in states with strong support for Perot, these 
mostly-Western states have long had higher turnout rates than the (mostly-Southern) states where 
Perot ran poorly.  A more appropriate test then regresses the difference in turnout by state from 
1988 to 1992 on the Perot vote share; this procedure implicitly controls for regional and other 
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(largely) time-invariant effects.  This test shows that each 1 percentage point rise in Perot's share is 
associated with a small and insignificant increase in turnout:   
 
 TURN92 - TURN88 = 4.25 + .102(PEROT)  R
2
 = .05 
            
The .102 coefficient, multiplied by Perot's 18.9% national vote share, implies a turnout impact of 
about 2 percentage points.  But, with a standard error of .064, the Perot coefficient is not 
significantly different from zero.      
 Finally, the Perot share was included in the pooled time-series cross-section model of 
state-level turnout for the 1976-92 period, in Table 1, which controls for numerous other turnout 
influences.  Values for PEROT for all states for all elections prior to 1992 are all set equal to zero.  
The PEROT coefficient is actually negative, although not statistically significant.    
 Most of the estimates derived from various procedures and data sources thus provide little 
support for the proposition that Perot's candidacy was the primary factor in raising turnout in the '92 
election.  This conclusion is consistent with that of Rosenstone et al. (1993), who report that Perot 
supporters among respondents in the 1992 NES were no more likely to vote or to participate in the 
campaign than were non-supporters, and that Perot's campaign had personally contacted less than 
3% of the electorate.   
 Nevertheless, it is possible that Perot's candidacy influenced the outcome of the presidential 
election.  Any 'direct' effects on the Clinton-Bush vote distribution were minor, if the exit polls can 
be believed: Perot voters split almost evenly between Clinton (38%) and Bush (37%) when asked 
their second choice.  'Indirect' effects of Perot's candidacy on the candidate choices of the 80% of 
voters who chose Clinton or Bush are more uncertain: Perot may have changed the dynamics of the 
race by focusing primarily on Bush's rather than Clinton's weaknesses.  
 
4. THE RECESSION 
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 A sluggish economy was widely credited in the media for stimulating interest in the 
election, and for playing a role in the turnout rise.  As with the case of third-party candidacies, 
history suggests skepticism regarding voter participation effects of recession.  Turnout fell in 1980 
relative to 1976, despite a third major candidacy and a national unemployment rate of 7.5% -- 
identical to the fall 1992 jobless rate.   
 Moreover, Rosenstone (1982) has found a negative effect of unemployment on turnout in a 
U.S. time-series model of elections from 1948-80: a 1-point rise in the short-term (< 5 weeks) 
unemployment rate reduces turnout by an estimated 2.8 percentage points.  Using the total 
unemployment rate, however, Rosenstone obtains a smaller and statistically insignificant 
coefficient.     
 The 'unemployment rate' variable in Table 1 is the total unemployment rate by state, 
averaged over the election year.  Its coefficient indicates that a 1 percentage point rise in a state's 
total unemployment rate pushes up turnout by a statistically insignificant one-fourteenth of one 
percentage point.  Applying this estimate to the country as a whole, the rise in the national 
unemployment rate from 5.4% in 1988 to 7.5% in 1992 implies a turnout increase of only 
one-seventh of a percentage point.     
 To the extent the recession had little or no impact on turnout, Clinton's support was not 
dependent on the participation of new voters registering economic discontent by voting against the 
incumbent.  Any such turnout effects were doubtless dwarfed by the number of voters who would 
have turned out anyway, regardless of prevailing economic conditions, who switched their votes 
from Bush to another candidate because they blamed him for the recession.  
 Clinton rather than Perot appears to have been the chief beneficiary of recession-related 
discontent with Bush's performance.  Clinton's vote share is positively correlated with state-level 
unemployment rates, but Perot's is not in simple cross-sectional regressions that also control for a 
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Southern regional dummy and percent black population.  Exit polls from VRS found that 56% of 
unemployed respondents voted for Clinton, while Perot's 20% support among this group barely 
exceeded his overall performance.   
 
5. MTV'S 'ROCK THE VOTE' Campaign 
 
 From exit polling of a random sample of voters in 1988 and 1992, coupled with U.S. 
Census data on the age distribution of the population, Voter Research and Surveys estimates that 
turnout for the 18-29 age group rose by 12% relative to 1988.  Attributing the entire increase in 
turnout within this age group to MTV's campaign is highly suspect, however.  While turnout 
among the young rose 12%, overall turnout rose by 9.5% (i.e., about 5 percentage points).   
 Even crediting the difference between these two increases to 'Rock the Vote' may be overly 
generous.  Turnout in the 30-44 and 45-59 age groups rose by 11% and 12%, respectively; only for 
the oldest (60+) group was the turnout rise substantially lower (at 2%) than for the 18- to 
29-year-olds.  Furthermore, the increases for the 30-44 and 45-59 groups were from a larger base, 
as those groups -- unlike the young -- already voted at high rates.  For example, a 12% increase 
from a base of about 40% turnout for young persons implies a 4.8 percentage-point increase, to 
44.8.  The same 12% rise from a base of 60% for middle-aged persons implies a 7.2 
percentage-point rise, to 67.2% turnout.     
 This arithmetic indicates that the turnout rise in the under-30 category represented only 
about one-twelfth of the maximum possible rise, while the increase in the 45-59 category was 
nearly one-fifth of the maximum possible rise.  While there were about 2 million more voters aged 
18 to 29 in 1992 compared to 1988, by these estimates, this age group failed to pull its weight: it 
comprises over one-fourth of the voting age population, but accounted for only about one-sixth of 
the 12 million-plus total increase in turnout.  
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 Among respondents to the 1992 NES aged 18-24, 53.8% reported having voted, versus a 
mere 44.3% in 1988.  This increase exceeded that of respondents aged 25 and over, 72.3% of 
whom reported voting in 1988, compared to 77.5% in 1992.  For respondents aged 18-29, the 
increase was from 50.0% to 61.1%, compared to a rise from 74.9% to 78.9% for respondents aged 
30 and over.  These figures are based on self-reports, however, while VRS estimates are based on 
comparing random samples of actual voters at the polls to known characteristics of the population.   
 Similarly, the Census Bureau's Current Population Surveys (CPS) for November 1988 and 
November 1992 shows larger increases in turnout for younger age groups, but these estimates are 
also based on self-reports, or the reports of family members (see Table A in Jennings, 1993).  
Perhaps 'Rock the Vote' succeeded in making young people more embarrassed to admit not having 
voted, but not in actually getting them to the polls.    
   Even if the assumption were made that the NES and CPS self-reports of turnout are more 
accurate than estimates based on exit polls, and this disproportionate increase in turnout among the 
young is attributable entirely to 'Rock the Vote,' the MTV-sponsored campaign would still account 
only for a tiny fraction of the nearly 6-point rise in the aggregate turnout rate.  If the difference 
between the 6.6 percentage point increase in turnout among 18-24 year olds indicated in the Census 
figures and the 3.3% rise indicated for the other age groups combined were credited entirely to 
'Rock the Vote,' that would account for only about 750,000 young voters -- far short of Lippert's 
claim of two million.  Given the Census estimates of a total of nearly 114 million votes and of an 
overall turnout of 61.3%, three-quarters of a million votes represents less than one-half of one 
percentage point of turnout.    
   Even if the increase in 1992 turnout, relative to 1988, among young people is not simply an 
artifact of increased 'overreporting,' the increase may well be due to factors other than 'Rock the 
Vote.'  The CPS data reported in Jennings (1993, Table A) suggest that 1988 was the real outlier, 
with only 36.2% of young people reporting that they voted in that year.  By historical standards, 
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turnout in 1988 was abnormally low among the under-45 population, and was abnormally high in 
1992 for older voters, according to this data.     
     Exit polls clearly indicate that Clinton's margin over Bush among young voters was much 
greater than his overall margin (see Table 2).  Any increase in turnout among the young may thus 
have contributed to his victory.  This outcome is ironic given that the campaign to place warning 
labels on music with offensive lyrics was led by Tipper Gore, the wife of Clinton's running mate, 
and that the inspiration for 'Rock the Vote' was the supposed threat of censorship represented by 
this campaign.   
 [TABLE 2 HERE]  
      
 
6. THE SPREAD OF 'MOTOR VOTER' PROGRAMS 
 
 Perot's candidacy, the recession and 'Rock the Vote' are each election-specific variables that 
may be irrelevant for turnout levels in future elections.  Passage of the National Voter Registration 
Act (NVRA) in the spring of 1993, however, may represent a permanent upward force on turnout.   
   
 The NVRA is popularly known as the 'motor voter' bill, as its provision for registering 
voters at driver's license bureaus is widely expected to be its most effective feature -- as an analysis 
of such programs already in effect in many states has found (Knack, 1995).  Some version of the 
key motor voter provision was implemented in the majority of states between 1975 (Michigan was 
the first) and 1992.  'Active' versions of motor voter similar to that mandated by the NVRA had 
been implemented in 16 states by the 1992 election ('active' motor voter programs are those that 
specifically ask on the driver's license application, or that require agency clerks to request verbally, 
whether the applicant wishes to register to vote, while 'passive' programs typically make voter 
registration forms available on countertops or upon request by applicants, and are demonstrably less 
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effective in registering voters).  The impact of motor voter can thus be estimated using the 
state-level model.    
 Several states and the District of Columbia adopted 'active' motor voter programs between 
the 1988 and 1992 elections.
ii
  The recent spread of motor voter legislation at the state level is thus 
a fourth factor to include on a list of possible contributors to the 1992 turnout rise.  Motor voter 
programs were implemented in every state before the 1996 election; any portion of the 1992 turnout 
rise that is attributable to motor voter will not only be permanent, but will be augmented by many 
more such programs.   
 Using data for the 1976-92 period, Knack (1995) shows that 'active' motor voter 
substantially raises registration rates, and raises turnout to a more modest degree (estimated turnout 
effects are larger for midterm than for presidential-year elections).  That study introduces a 
'duration'-based specification for motor voter, coded as the number of elections since 
implementation of a program.  This specification allows motor voter's impact to increase with 
time, as more of a state's voting-age population has the opportunity to register when applying for a 
driver's license, or license renewal, the longer the program has been in effect.  A simple dummy 
variable specification would underestimate the eventual impact of motor voter, by coding new 
programs the same as mature programs that have reached more drivers.  The square of the duration 
term is also included in turnout equations, reflecting the fact that the marginal effect of time 
diminishes as eventually all driver's license renewal applicants will have had prior opportunities to 
register via motor voter.   
 Using the data from Knack (1995), the model in Table 1 includes these motor voter 
variables.  Coefficients imply a slightly smaller impact on turnout than in Knack (1995), which did 
not include some of the other regressors used here.     
 The rise in 1992 turnout relative to that for 1988 may be attributable in part to the 'maturing' 
of motor voter programs already implemented in several states, and to the adoption of such 
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programs in other states subsequent to the 1988 election.  A simulation exercise was used to 
estimate the rise in turnout attributable to these changes in registration programs.  Presidential-year 
estimates for motor voter's impact were obtained from a state-level turnout model (similar to that of 
Table 1) for the 1976-88 elections.  By multiplying the 1976-88 model coefficient estimates by the 
actual 1992 values for each variable and summing, predicted turnout rates for 1992 were generated. 
 This procedure was duplicated substituting the 1988 values for the motor voter duration variables, 
generating predicted turnout rates on the (false) assumption that the presence and age of motor 
voter programs remained unchanged in 1992 from their 1988 values.  The second, 'false' set of 
values  was subtracted from the 'true' predicted rates to estimate the increase in turnout for each 
state attributable to the spread and maturation of motor voter programs.  A weighted (by voting-age 
population) mean of these state impacts was computed to arrive at an overall estimate.  Results of 
this simulation indicate that the introduction of new motor voter programs since the 1988 election, 
coupled with the maturing of programs that were in place but still relatively new as of the 1988 
election, account for only about a one-seventh of a percentage point of the 1992 turnout.
iii
    
 Coefficients for the presidential-year model indicate an eventual average turnout impact of 
motor voter of less than 2 percentage points.  Turnout estimates from a model pooling the 
presidential and midterm elections, or from one using OLS instead of WLS, are somewhat larger.  
Applying these larger estimates to the presidential-year data, motor voter would account for a larger 
increase in turnout, but still less than one percentage point.    
 Does motor voter help the Democrats, as Republican opponents of the NVRA in Congress 
feared?  Evidence in Knack and White (1996) suggests at best a modest edge for the Democrats.  
Following implementation of motor voter, the proportion of registrants who register as 
independents rises significantly, but there is no shift in the Democrat-Republican balance in party 
registration.  The percentage vote for Democratic presidential candidates rises by about two 
percentage points, however.   
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7. CLOSENESS 
 
 More competitive elections may attract higher turnout, either because individual voters 
think their votes are more likely to be decisive, or because organizations face heightened incentives 
to mobilize voters in close races.  (See Foster, 1980, and Mueller, 1988, ch. 18 for summaries of 
the conflicting evidence on the closeness-turnout relationship.)  The 1992 race was somewhat 
closer than the 1988 race: the electoral margin was 370 to 168 in the former, versus 426 to 112 in 
the latter election.  The percentage margin for the popular vote was 5.6 points in 1992, compared 
to 7.8 in 1988.  The margin in actual votes was 5.8 million in 1992 and 7.1 million in 1988.   
 The state-level model provides some modest support for the view that closeness matters for 
turnout.  The coefficient on the 'vote margin' in Table 1 is negative and significant at the .05 level 
for a one-tailed test.  The point estimate is small, however: a 1-million-vote increase in the margin 
-- larger than the voting-age population of many states -- reduces a state's turnout by only 
three-quarters of one percentage point.  As the average state-level margin increased by only about 
25,000 votes -- one-fortieth of a million -- from 1988 to 1992, the estimated impact on turnout from 
increased closeness is a tiny fraction of a percentage point.   
 Of course, estimates from state-level data do not capture national-level competitiveness 
effects.  For example, regardless of the expected margin in one's state, one may perceive little 
incentive to vote if a landslide of other states for a particular candidate is anticipated.  Also, some 
voters are either unaware of or do not understand the electoral college system; their decisions may 
be affected solely by national-level competitiveness and thus will not be reflected in a state-level 
margin regression coefficient.  Analyses of survey data below will return to this dimension of the 
issue.    
 A casual look at the national time-series evidence also shows little indication of substantial 
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turnout effects of competitiveness.  No closeness-related differences can be discerned in the 
general downward trend from 1960 to 1988.  Turnout fell in 1968 from its 1964 level, despite the 
much closer race and a third-party candidate; turnout fell in 1976, relative to the 1972 landslide 
election, and turnout rose in 1984 -- a landslide year -- relative to 1980, which saw a closer race as 
well as a third-party candidate.  Neither does the pattern of year-dummy coefficients in the 
state-level model show any relationship to the national vote margins (Table 1).  The somewhat 
closer presidential race in 1992 relative to 1988 thus does not appear to have played a major role in 
the turnout increase. 
  
8. TERM LIMIT INITIATIVES 
 
 An additional election-specific event to address is the term limit movement, which 
succeeded in placing initiatives on the ballot in 14 states -- and in winning approval of all of them.  
Conceivably, this issue helped to push up participation rates, as angry voters mobbed to the polls to 
voice their protest against politics-as-usual:  
More than 230 state issues ranging from term limits to mandatory health insurance and 
curbs on gay rights were on Tuesday's ballots.  But none was as incendiary as the fire storm 
of demands for restrictions on the number of terms elected officials can serve.  Not since 
citizen initiatives first appeared on state ballots in 1898 has an issue so galvanized 
Americans. (Time, Nov. 16, 1992, p. 22) 
 
However, the 14 term limit states fail to show a significantly higher turnout rate than the other 37, 
either in simple cross-sectional tests, or in the time-series cross-sectional model of Table 1.  
 Was the Perot candidacy partially responsible for the 14-state sweep by term limit 
proponents?  Perot conceivably inspired many alienated voters to go to the polls, aiding the 
throw-the-bums-out campaign.
iv
  Little support is found for this thesis: among the 14 term limit 
states, there is a positive but moderate (.32) and insignificant correlation between the Perot vote 
share and the percentage of 'Yes' votes on term limitation.   
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9. 'POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT'  
 
 Beginning with The American Voter (Campbell et. al., 1960), voting in elections has been 
identified with a particular set of political attitudes, as measured by indicators in the NES of 
psychological involvement in politics.  Influential analyses of turnout decline have noted 
corresponding declines over time in some of these measures, which are significantly correlated 
cross-sectionally with turnout.  Abramson and Aldrich (1982) attributed a major portion of the 
post-1960 turnout drop to a diminishing sense of political efficacy and strength of partisan 
identification.  Teixeira (1987) has shown that having read newspaper articles about the political 
campaign is strongly correlated cross-sectionally with turnout, and that such newspaper reading has 
fallen over time.  Comparisons of some of these involvement measures for 1992 and other years 
may similarly provide some insight into the 1992 turnout rise.     
 The most dramatic increases in 'involvement' as evidenced by the 1992 NES were in the 
number of respondents indicating they were 'very interested in the campaign' (from 27.8% to 
38.8%; see Table 3) and who indicated they cared a lot about the outcome of the presidential race 
(61% to 74.8%).  Sizeable increases also are shown in Table 3 in the sense of 'civic duty' to vote 
(as indicated by agreement with the statement that one should vote even if one doesn't care who 
wins) and in 'efficacy' (measured by agreement with the statement 'people like me have a say' in 
government.  The percentages of respondents reporting that they were 'very interested' in the 
campaign and cared about the outcome were extraordinarily high not only relative to 1988, but from 
a historical perspective (see the time-series descriptive statistics of these items in Teixeira, 1992, 
pp. 41, 44).  However, the wording of the 'care' question was changed between the 1988 and 1992 
surveys, making it impossible to establish whether or not concern over election outcomes really 
increased among Americans.  Specifically, respondents in 1988 were asked 'would you say you 
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personally care a good deal which party wins the presidential election.'  In 1988 'who' was 
substituted for 'which party.'   
 [TABLE 3 HERE] 
 The role of these attitudinal/involvement measures is investigated in Tables 3 and 4.  A 
turnout regression for the pooled 1988 and 1992 samples was run, using a set of demographic 
variables commonly included in such analyses, to generate estimates of the effects of the attitudinal 
measures.
v
   
 [TABLE 4 HERE] 
 Using these estimates from Table 4, in conjunction with data on changes in the means of 
these variables from 1988 to 1992 in the first two columns of Table 3, the sources of the turnout 
rise are decomposed in the third column of Table 3.  Increases in the 'care' item alone account for a 
2.1 percentage-point rise in turnout, with the interest item accounting for an additional 1 point, and 
civic duty and efficacy together adding 3/4 of a point.  Declines in partisanship and newspaper 
reading
vi
 together suppressed turnout by one-half of a percentage point.  Demographic variables 
individually and collectively account for very little of the turnout change, as may be expected over a 
mere four-year period.    
 The bulk of the 6-point turnout rise can thus be 'explained' by increases in measures of 
psychological involvement in politics that are correlated with turnout.  Explaining behavioral 
involvement (turnout) in terms of psychological involvement, however, 
comes close to being true by definition...The American Voter and its trailing 
literature do not give us an explicit theory of political motivation that could serve to 
account for voter turnout/abstention below a surface level (Dennis, 1991, p. 26).  
As Fiorina (1981) warns: 'Statistical explanation is not identical to substantive explanation.'   
 From a theoretic standpoint, there is something profoundly unsatisfying about attributing 
turnout trends to variations in sense of efficacy, partisanship, and reading newspaper articles about 
the campaign.  What accounts for these variations?  As Teixeira, one of the foremost practitioners 
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of this approach to turnout change, has acknowledged more recently, 'this type of analysis does not 
reveal where these proximate factors came from...' (1992, ch. 2).  To the extent that variables such 
as heightened interest, concern over the outcome, and efficacy played a role in the turnout rise, 
improvement in these 'attitudes' is apparently largely unrelated to Perot's candidacy, 'Rock the Vote,' 
the recession, and term limits -- as none of these phenomena can be strongly linked to turnout.   
 If 'Rock the Vote' stimulated interest among young people in the political campaign, 
presumably there would be evidence in the survey data.  In fact, there is a sizeable increase in the 
proportion of under-30 NES respondents who claimed to have been 'very much interested' in the 
campaign and who cared about the outcome.  However, these 12.7 and 16.6 percentage-point rises 
in interest and concern respectively are nearly matched by 11.0 and 13.8-point rises among all NES 
respondents (Table 3).  Civic duty rose slightly more for the under-30 group, but efficacy rose less 
among young people than in the whole NES sample, and strength of partisan identification fell 
more for the young than for the over-30 group (Table 3).   
 The closeness issue can also be re-examined with the benefit of NES survey data.  In 1992, 
79% of the NES sample expected the presidential election to be close, compared to only 70% in 
1988 (Table 3).  This survey measure is sometimes uncorrelated with turnout in the NES, for 
example in 1984.  Perceived closeness is significantly correlated with turnout in both 1988 and 
1992, however, with a coefficient in the pooled regression of 5.22% (Table 4).  Employing this 
coefficient as an upper-bound estimate of the closeness-turnout partial correlation, an increase in 
perceived closeness can account for up to a one-half percentage point rise in turnout in this model 
from 1988 to 1992.  This estimate does not materially alter the conclusion reached above that a 
closer election in 1992 was responsible for only a small portion of the turnout rise. 
 The NES also asks whether respondents expect the presidential contest to be close within 
their own state.  The proportion expecting close contests within their state rose only from .59 to .61 
from the 1988 to the 1992 survey.  The point estimate for the impact of this variable when added to 
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the Table 4 model is a statistically insignificant .5, only one-tenth that of the NES item measuring 
perceived closeness in the race at the national level.  This evidence is consistent with that obtained 
from the state-level model.            
 
11. 'STAKES' IN THE ELECTION 
 
 The Downsian voting model as formalized by Tullock (1967, ch. 7) and by Riker and 
Ordeshook (1968) has been interpreted as implying that the greater the perceived difference 
between the two candidates, the greater the incentive to vote.  As Downs (1957, ch. 13) himself 
originally noted, the infinitesimal probability that an individual voter is decisive suggests that these 
'instrumental' benefits will not exceed the costs of voting, so that a rational choice framework is 
consistent with the decision to vote only if something like 'civic duty' or other private benefits to 
voting are introduced into the model.  Nevertheless, greater differences between the two candidates 
may increase the incentives to vote as perceived by voters with an exaggerated subjective 
probability of being decisive.  Or, greater differences between the two candidates may generate 
greater mobilization efforts on the part of groups (including party organizations) with stakes in the 
outcome that are collectively large enough to justify expending resources on invoking group 
participatory norms (Uhlaner, 1989).    
 Distances between an individual's position in policy space and those of the candidates may 
also influence turnout decisions.  'Alienation' may lead some voters to abstain, as neither candidate 
comes sufficiently close to their preferences to motivate them to go to the polls.  Alternatively, 
some people may be more likely to vote if they fear victory by a particular candidate: aversion to a 
candidate perceived as dangerous may motivate their participation.   Measures representing each of 
these three concepts were created from NES ideology items which asked the respondent to place 
him- or herself and each of the major candidates on a 7-point scale ranging from extremely liberal 
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to extremely conservative.  For the candidate differential measure, the distances between Bush and 
Dukakis (1988) and between Bush and Clinton (1992), as perceived by the respondent, were 
calculated.  For the alienation measure, the distance between the respondent and his/her 
most-favored candidate (including Perot where applicable) was calculated.  For the aversion 
measure, the distance between the respondent and the candidate farthest away in issue space 
(including Perot where applicable) was calculated.
vii
   The three measures were added to the 
regression model of Table 4, with estimated coefficients and standard errors (OLS model) reported 
below:
viii
  
Variable   Coefficient  Std. error 
Candidate difference  1.71   0.70 
 
'Alienation'   -.17   0.78  
 
'Aversion'       -.09   0.79 
 
Only the candidate differential measure is statistically significant and in the hypothesized direction. 
 The aversion measure fails to show the hypothesized sign.     
 Changes in the means of these three measures between 1988 and 1992 in the NES are 
reported in Table 3.  Even with Perot in the race, NES respondents on average were no closer to 
their preferred candidate in issue space in 1992 than in 1988, using this one-dimensional issue 
space of political ideology.  On average, respondents were 1.06 places away from their preferred 
candidate on the ideology scale in both elections (Table 3).  Thus, there is no evidence that 
'alienation' as defined in terms of distance from voter's ideal points diminished from one election to 
the other, or that alienation-based abstention exists in the first place.  These findings undermine the 
basic rationale behind the belief that Perot's candidacy should have increased turnout.   
 Perceived differences between Bush and the Democratic candidate actually declined slightly 
from 1988 to 1992.  Despite Clinton's attempt to define himself as a New Democrat, his mean 
ideology score (3.19) was to the left of Dukakis' score (3.24) for 1988.  However, Bush was moved 
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left by slightly more himself (to 5.05 in 1992 from 5.11 in 1988).  Since candidate differences did 
not widen in 1992 relative to 1988, they cannot account for any of the difference in turnout across 
the two elections (Table 3).  
  'Aversion' increased somewhat from 1988 to 1992 (Table 3).  This modest rise had no 
influence on turnout, however, as aversion is uncorrelated with turnout.
ix
    
 
12. SUMMARY 
  
 Several intuitively plausible explanations for the 1992 turnout increase have been examined 
here, with each shown to have at best modest impacts, using various data sources and methods.  In 
a state-level turnout model controlling for most of these variables, an unexplained gap between 
1988 and 1992 turnout of more than four percentage points remained.  Using point estimates from 
the Table 1 model, higher unemployment, the spread of motor voter, and the Perot candidacy 
collectively account for only a fraction of one percentage point of the turnout increase.  
 Year-dummy coefficients suggest 1988 may be the real outlier, rather than 1992.  The 
conclusion that the turnout rise is attributable primarily to factors peculiar to the 1988 election is 
consistent with the evidence presented here on the weak impacts of the Perot candidacy, 'Rock the 
Vote,' and other factors specific to the 1992 elections which were popularly believed to be 
responsible for the turnout rise.     
 Survey evidence suggests few clues as to what might have been special about 1988, 
however, and even provides some indication that 1992 was the true outlier in some respects.  The 
percentage of respondents who were 'very interested' in the campaign in 1992 was 38.8%, the 
highest since the 38.9% of 1968 (Teixeira, 1992).  The 27.8% of 1980 fell only a little short of 
1984's 28.4% and 1980's 29.8%.     
 The percentage of respondents claiming to 'care' about the election outcome soared to a 
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record high of 74.8%.  The previous high was only 65.5% in 1964, and 1988's 61.0% exceeded the 
values for 1972, 1976, and 1980.  Much of 1992's dramatic rise in the number of respondents 
concerned over the outcome is likely due to the change in question wording, however.   
 Rosenstone et al. (1993) statistically explain most of the 1992 rise in turnout relative to 
1988, largely in terms of variables representing psychological involvement (although they fail to 
note the change in question wording of the 'care' item.)  This 'involvement'-based explanation is 
more question-begging than illuminating, however.  Why was concern over the outcome higher, 
when the ideological distance between the candidates was no greater?  Why did interest and 
efficacy increase, and how did they raise turnout, given the difficulty in tracing turnout effects to 
Perot's candidacy, to the recession, or to 'Rock the Vote'?  Survey research has been much more 
successful at measuring attitudes than in linking these attitudes to campaign- and election-related 
events.          
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   Table 1 
 State-Level Turnout, 1976-92 
      
Variable Coefficient 
(std. error) 
percent with high school 
diploma (> 25 years old) 
0.330** 
(0.096) 
log of per capita income 7.088* 
(3.922) 
percent living at residence < 5 
years 
-0.233 
(0.172) 
percent adults who are 
18-24 years old 
-0.810 
(0.465) 
Governor's race on ballot 1.724* 
(0.866) 
Senate race on ballot 0.204 
(0.230) 
mail-in registration 1.886* 
(1.014) 
registration 
closing date 
-0.053 
(0.057) 
Perot vote share 
 
-0.026 
(0.065) 
unemployment 
rate 
0.072 
(0.101) 
motor voter duration 
 
0.606* 
(0.343) 
square of motor voter duration -0.048 
(0.040) 
"passive" motor voter  0.476 
(0.417) 
vote margin (in 100,000s) -0.075* 
(0.039) 
term limit initiative 
on ballot  
0.369 
(0.612) 
             
  Sample size is 250. R
2
 is .96.  State and year dummy coefficients not shown.  A  
  * (**) indicates significance at .05 (.01) for one-tailed tests.  Note that R
2
 in  
  this weighted least squares model does not have its usual interpretation.  
 
 
 
 Table 2 
 VRS Exit Polls: Vote Choice by Age 
 
  Group   Clinton Bush  Perot 
 
  18-29   44%  34  22 
  30-44   42  38  20 
  45-59   41  40  19 
  60+   50  38  12 
  1st-time voters 48  30  22 
 
 
 
 Table 3 
 Decomposition of Turnout Change, 1988 and 1992 NES 
 
Sample  All  < 30 
  Means 
 
Turnout 
Diff.  
 Means Turnout 
Diff. 
 1988 1992  88-92  1988 1992  88-92 
voted (%) 69.7 75.4   --- 49.5 61.1  --- 
very interested in campaign (%) 27.8 38.8  1.01 16.8 29.5  1.17 
care about outcome (%) 61.0 74.8  2.11 52.0 68.6  2.53 
read about campaign in newspaper (%) 48.6 45.9 -0.29 34.6 31.2 -0.34 
expect close election (%) 69.7 79.1  0.49 64.8 79.8  0.78 
"strong" Democrat or Republican (%) 31.7 29.4 -0.19 24.4 18.7 -0.48 
should vote even if don't care who wins (%) 37.1 41.2  0.37 27.7 33.6  0.54 
people like me have a say (%) 49.9 57.5  0.38 49.9 55.2  0.26 
Dem/Rep candidates' ideology gap (7-pt. scale) 2.73 2.57 -0.27 2.49 2.47 -0.03 
Respondent/preferred candidate gap (7-pt. scale) 1.06 1.06  0.00 1.11 1.15 -0.01 
Respondent/least-preferred cand. gap (7-pt. scale) 2.98 3.15 -0.02 2.80 3.17 -0.03 
regular churchgoer (%) 36.0 37.3  0.07 24.2 24.8  0.03 
college degree (%) 19.5 22.9  0.27 14.1 16.4  0.18 
high school diploma (%) 76.6 78.7  0.34 81.7 87.3  0.90 
years at residence  10.9 11.3  0.13  4.6  6.4  0.73 
age in years 45.1 45.7  0.13 24.5 24.6  0.02 
log of household income 10.1 10.0 -0.26  9.9  9.9 -0.16 
registration closing date (days) 25.6 26.2 -0.29 25.4 26.7 -0.60 
 
 
 
   Table 4 
 NES Turnout, 1988 and 1992 Pooled 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient  
(std. error) 
intercept -30.26 
(7.34) 
very interested in campaign 9.22 
(1.41) 
care about outcome 
of presidential election 
15.26 
(1.46) 
read about campaign 
in newspaper 
10.76 
(1.32) 
expect close election 5.22 
(1.44) 
"strong" Democrat or Republican 8.45 
(1.39) 
should vote even if don't care about 
election outcome 
9.08 
(1.28) 
people like me have a say about what govt. 
does 
5.00 
(1.29) 
regular churchgoer  5.33 
(1.30) 
high school diploma 
 
16.04 
(1.71) 
college degree 7.95 
(1.60) 
years at current residence 0.39 
(0.06) 
age 0.21 
(0.04) 
log of household income  5.30 
(0.68) 
registration closing date 
  
-0.45 
(0.07) 
 
  The sample size is 3702.  The adjusted R
2
 is .29.  All coefficients are  
  significantly different from 0 at the .001 level.       
   
  
 
 
 
 
i. Data sources are described fully in Knack (1995). 
ii. States included IA, MT, NC, NJ, OR, WA, and WV.  North Carolina 
reinstated an active program that had lapsed under Republican 
administration.  Iowa's did not apply to renewals, only to new 
applicants.  Reclassifying Iowa as non-motor voter because of this 
limitation in the program does not substantially alter any of the 
findings reported here.  Data sources for motor voter programs are 
described in Knack (1995).  
iii. A simulation using motor voter coefficients estimated from models 
updated to include the 1992 data (i.e., from results in Table 1) yields 
similar effects from motor voter.   
iv. See Congressional Quarterly, November 7, 1992, p. 3593.  In the 
1992 NES, more term limit supporters than opponents favored Perot 
(16.7% to 13.1%), believed many politicians were crooked (43.7% to 
34.6%), and had low trust in government (66.2% to 55.8%); all three 
differences are significant at .01 for 1-tailed tests. 
v. Nonlinear specifications for age and length of residence change 
the results surprisingly little, so were dropped in favor of more 
readily-interpretable linear specifications.  Income is the (log of 
the) midpoint of the relevant household income interval.  Results 
from logit models are very similar; OLS results are presented here 
for ease of interpreting regression coefficients.  The dependent 
variable is in percentages, so the coefficient on 'high school 
diploma,' for example, indicates that graduating from high school 
  
 
 
 
  
is associated with a 16-percentage-point increase in the likelihood 
of voting.  
vi. The decline in newspaper reading about the campaign is due to 
fewer people reading daily newspapers.  Among respondents who read 
a newspaper daily, attention to articles about the campaign was 
actually substantially higher in 1992 than in 1988. 
vii. All three variables are positive for every respondent, as they 
are measured in distances along the 7-point scale.  For voters, the 
preferred candidate is the one they reported voting for.  Nonvoters 
were asked which candidate they preferred. 
viii . This regression contained only 1923 observations, as many 
respondents could not place themselves on this 7-point scale, or could 
do so only upon further prompting (those cases were dropped as being 
insufficiently reliable). 
ix. One might expect that the 'care' item is highly collinear with 
these three 'stakes' variables.  Correlations of each with the 'care' 
item are all very modest, and deleting 'care' from the turnout 
regression changes coefficients for these three variables only 
trivially.  As a dichotomous variable, 'care' may be an insufficiently 
fine measure to capture much of the variation in the three 
interval-scale 'stakes' variables.  'Care' also likely encompasses 
character and competency evaluations, as well as policy preferences 
not captured by the ideology scale. 
